Alexander Dugin, the Issue of Post-Soviet Fascism, and Russian Political Discourse Today by Andreas Umland in Ukrayinska Pravda, 23 juli 2007.

The past two years witnessed a welcome sensitization of the Russian public towards skinhead attacks and ultra-nationalist propaganda. In view of escalating violent attacks and other actions against foreigners, the debate on Russian fascism is currently experiencing a new high in the Russian media. There was a similar debate in the mid-1990s, when the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the “intransigent opposition,” a state of near-civil war in Moscow, the ascent of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the appearance of neo-Nazi parties, and the first Chechen war, gave rise to the notion of a “Weimar Russia.” Even though this construct has made only rare appearances in commentaries in recent months, the current media debate is also marked by alarmism.

It is to be welcomed that the increasing right-wing extremist tendencies within the Russian party landscape and youth culture, which had been largely ignored for many years, are now at least partially acknowledged by the Russian public, and countermeasures are being debated. Even the Russian judiciary which has been known for its pro-nationalist bias is beginning to submit to the pressure of public opinion (or the presidential administration), and now applies the Russian penal code’s section on xenophobic crimes more frequently than was the case during the 1990s. Other promising developments include the sharp reactions of state officials to a xenophobic campaign advertisement aired by the Rodina (Motherland) alliance ahead of elections for the Moscow municipal parliament and the measures against the often deadly skinhead attacks on immigrants and visiting students. Official statements on such issues occasionally refer to the “anti-fascist” heritage of the Soviet Union and to the Russian people’s alleged special deep-rooted aversion against fascism.

Despite such encouraging signs, the Kremlin-controlled mass media have kept an altogether ambivalent stance toward right-wing extremist tendencies. Although manifest anti-Semitism and violent racism are now heavily criticized and visibly stigmatized, other xenophobic patterns remain present, or are even increasing, in foreign news reporting and political commentaries. In addition to the traditional anti-Western, anti-Baltic, anti-Gypsy, and anti-Polish reflexes, this is increasingly true for prejudices against Ukrainians and Caucasians, recently, especially, against Georgians. Unquestionably, though, it is the US that holds first place among the “enemies of Russia,” as projected by the Russian state media. The increasingly primitive and profound anti-Americanism seen, for example, in prime time political television shows like Odnako (“However”, hosted by Mikhail Leontiev), Real’naya politika (“Real Politics”, hosted by Gleb Pavlovsky), or Post Scriptum (hosted by Alexei Pushkov) is raised to the level of a Manichean world-view, where the US is made responsible for the majority of mishaps and failures in recent Russian, and indeed world history, and where US society mutates into the negative Other of Russian civilization. It is curious that Germany – the country that has caused Russia the most harm in recent history – is often excepted from this paranoid perception of the external world and stylized as a collective friend of Russia, probably not least because of Putin’s personal preferences (a distorted view that has, however, been stoked by the unorthodox approach to Russia of former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder).

Finally, despite the increasing censure of certain right-wing extremist tendencies, the representatives of ultra-nationalist political groups regarded as close to President Putin have been excepted from the Kremlin’s campaigns to discredit the radically nationalist camp. This is true, for instance, with regard to Zhirinovsky’s so-called Liberal Democratic Party, although many statements made by Zhirinovsky and his entourage equally stir xenophobic hatred among the population (for example, his notorious pamphlet “The Last Leap toward the South”). Last year, Putin personally awarded the Order of Merit for the Fatherland to Zhirinovsky – a man who in September 1995 had physically attacked a female MP, Yevgenia Tishkovskaya, in the State Duma in front of TV cameras.

Besides such tendencies in the broader public, there are similarly contradictory developments in the discourse of the elites and political pundits. On the one hand, the political leadership is promoting integration of Russia into Western organizations such as the G8 and the WTO. On the other hand, the political discourse of experts, as well as intellectual life in general, are characterized by the spread of an anti-Western consensus often described as “Eurasian.” Its essence is the assertion that Russia is “different” from, or indeed, by its nature, the opposite of the US. The Russian book market is experiencing a glut of vituperative political lampoons whose main features include pathological anti-Americanism, absurd conspiracy theories, apocalyptic visions of the future, and bizarre fantasies of national rebirth. Among the more or less widely read authors of such concoctions are Sergei Kurginyan, Igor Shafarevich, Oleg Platonov, and Maxim Kalashnikov (a.k.a. Vladimir Kucherenko).

Probably the best-known writer and commentator of this kind is Aleksandr Dugin (b. 1962), who holds a doctorate in political science (from an obscure Russian provincial institute) and is the founder, chief ideologue, and chairman of the so-called International “Eurasian Movement.” This Movement’s Supreme Council boasts among its members the Russian Federation’s Culture Minister Aleksandr Sokolov, Vice Speaker of the Federation Council, Aleksandr Torshin, Presidential Advisor Aslambek Aslakhanov, several diplomats and scholars as well as other illustrious personages, including some marginal Western intellectuals and CIS politicians.

Among the latter are Nataliya Vitrenko, the well-known head of the so-called Progessive Socialist Party of Ukraine, and Dmitro Korchinsky, formerly leader of the Ukrainian fascist party UNA-UNSO and now chairman of the Bratstvo (Brotherhood) Party. Dugin’s name was recently mentioned in Ukrainian mass media in connection with the scandal that arose when Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykola Zhulinsky was barred from entering Russia during a private trip to St. Petersburg this summer. This was interpreted as a retaliation for Ukraine’s refusal to permit Dugin entering Ukraine shortly before. In June 2006, Dugin had been declared persona non grata in Ukraine until 2011 for violating Ukrainian law, and was thus deported back to Russia after he had arrived by plane at Simferopol airport in early June 2007 in order to attend the festival “The Great Russian Word” organized by the Russian Community of the Crimea. In spite of this conflict with the Ukrainian authorities, the youth organization of Dugin’s Movement, the Eurasian Union of Youth, has an active branch in Ukraine, and is particularly visible in Sumy, Kyiv and the Crimea.

Dugin’s increasing celebrity in the CIS is remarkable considering that the chief “neo-Eurasian” is not only among the most influential, but also one of the most brazen of Russia’s ultra-nationalist publicists. While authors such as Kurginyan or Shafarevich are satisfied to promote a renaissance of classical Russian anti-Western sentiments in their pamphlets and subtly draw on Western sources, Dugin admits openly that his main ideas are based on non-Russian anti-democratic concepts such as European integral Traditionalism (e.g. René Guénon, Julius Evola, Claudio Mutti, etc.), Western geopolitics (e.g. Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer), the German “conservative revolution” (e.g. Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck), and the francophone New Right (e.g. Alain de Benoist, Robert Steuckers, Jean Thiriart).

Furthermore, during the 1990s, Dugin repeatedly hinted at his sympathy for selected aspects of Italian Fascism and National Socialism, such as the SS and its Ahnenerbe (“Ancestral Heritage”) Institute, and has described the Third Reich as the most consistent incarnation of the “Third Way” that he explicitly advocates. In the chapter “Fascism – Boundless and Red” of the online version of his 1997 book Tampliery Proletariata (The Templar Knights of the Proletariat), he expressed the hope that the inconsistent application of originally correct ideas by Hitler, Mussolini, etc. would, eventually, be followed in post-Soviet Russia by the emergence of a “fascist fascism”. In Dugin’s apocalyptic worldview, global history consists of a centuries-old confrontation between hierarchically organized “Eurasian” continental powers and liberal “Atlantic” naval powers. Today, this confrontation is carried out between Russia and the US as the main representatives of the two antagonistic types of civilization, and its final battle is approaching (Dugin uses the German word Endkampf, which has Nazi connotations, without a Russian translation).

One might expect Dugin, and other extremely right-wing pundits offering similar pro-fascist statements, to be subjected to the same public stigmatization as neo-Nazi parties and skinhead groups are currently experiencing in Russia. However, this has not been the case so far. On the contrary, Dugin and others of his ilk, such as the well-known editor-in-chief of Russia’s leading ultranationalist weekly Zavtra (“Tomorrow”), Aleksandr Prochanov, are popular guests in prime-time political television shows such as Vremena (“Times”, hosted by Vladimir Pozner), Tem vremenem (“In the Meantime”, hosted by Aleksandr Archangelsky), Voskresnyi vecher’ (“Sunday Evening”), or K Bar’eru (“To the Barricade”, hosted by Vladimir Solovyov), and are even invited to popular talk shows like Pust’ govoryat (“Let Them Speak”, hosted by Andrei Malakhov).

The fact that Dugin has so far been “spared” by the Kremlin-controlled media and his political opponents is not only due to his recent posing as a “radical centrist” and fanatical supporter of Putin as well as his ability to win sympathies of prominent members of the Russian legislative and executive braches. He has also managed to avoid the charge of promoting fascism by adapting his writings and public image to the distorted conception of fascism inherited from Soviet propaganda. In the post-Soviet discourse, the term “fascism” is equated with German National Socialism and its external trappings, such as the swastika or Roman salute. Occasionally, the propagandistic usage of the term “fascism” goes so far as to include all ideas regarded as “anti-Russian”, and, paradoxically, becomes thus a rhetorical instrument in xenophobic agitation campaigns of Russian ultra-nationalists.

The example of Dugin illustrates that, as a result of the idiosyncratic conception of generic fascism in post-Soviet Russia, it is sufficient to rhetorically dissociate oneself from the worst crimes of Nazi Germany and to refrain from blatant copying of Nazi symbols in order to avoid public stigmatization as a “fascist”. This approach would, at least, explain why, on the one hand, obviously neo-Nazi groups such as the Russkoe Natsional’no Edinstvo (Russian National Unity) of Aleksandr Barkashov or skinhead gangs are being vocally suppressed by the executive and judiciary, while on the other hand ultra-nationalist writers who, in terms of their rhetoric, are no less radical are not only tolerated, but have unhindered access to public platforms and state-controlled media, and are, sometimes, allocated an active role in PR projects of the Kremlin’s political technologists.

Another factor in favor of Dugin and similar publicists is the return of the Russian leadership to quasi-Orwellian forms of organizing public discourse. Kremlin-controlled political reporting in the mass media has become a succession of national-patriotic happenings in which international developments of any kind – whether a Russia-China summit or Russian athletes’ performance at the Olympics, the “Orange Revolution” or foreign success of a Russian fantasy movie – are exaggerated into either collective triumphs or shared humiliations of the Russian nation under its faithful leadership. The attendant superficiality and emotionality of public debates, which occasionally degenerate into bizarre shouting matches between participants of political television shows, replace serious analysis. Political commentaries are fixated on the “here and now” which, in the case of Dugin, may have contributed to that his well-known neo-fascist stance during the 1990s has been “forgotten”. The mantra-like disparagement of the West that accompanies the agitational realignment of foreign news reporting increases the playing field for the propagation of anti-Western slogans which also furthers the spread of extremist ideas proposed by Dugin and theorists with similar leanings.

Will the newfound sensitivity towards nationalist tendencies lead to a sustained return to tolerant and liberal aspects of Russia’s political tradition? Or is this new tendency no more than the latest episode in the Putin administration’s fluctuating media campaigns? One can identify two contrary trends – one ideological, the other pragmatic – whose collision has restored a certain measure of controversy to the generally dull public discourse in Russia. On the one hand, the dualist worldview introduced by the Kremlin in the past few years – the simple, but honest Russians struggling for independence against a devious, soulless, imperialist West – fulfils an important role in legitimating the “tough” course of the resurging Russia under its new president. However, the officially approved paranoia also opens the floodgates for radical conclusions. Since the US model of society is presented as the antithesis of Russian civilization, one should not be surprised when youth gangs of violent thugs try to prevent an “Americanization” of Russian society in their way. The damage caused by such reactions to the international image of Russia is, in turn, incompatible with the equally strong tendency towards establishing the country as a respected partner of the Western countries and as becoming a part of the “civilized world” (the preferred Russian term for the economically advanced democratic states). Besides, the leadership of the Kremlin appears to be considering large-scale immigration as a way of replenishing the rapidly dwindling population of the Russian Federation, which would create new, potentially explosive, tensions. Finally, the fanatical anti-Americanism and pro-Iranian positions of Dugin and others are in contradiction to a number of security policies of the Kremlin and its efforts to join the international coalition against terrorism as a full member. Due to these and other challenges in the coming years, the particulars of the – at least partial – handover of power from Putin to his successor in 2008 will gain additional importance.

Ukrayinksa Pravda

'Eurasia and Europe should Cooperate against America' interview met Alexandr Dugin

According to Russian strategist Alexandr Dugin, geopolitics as a philosophy of location is one of the most fundamental instruments that the postmodern age has developed against the historicism of modernity.

Dugin has attempted to make the global status of Russia meaningful among generations, in the framework of geopolitics that he defines as mankind's mutual dealing with location.

Russia had taken the stage as an empire due to its historical and cultural accumulation and its geostrategic position on the world stage. In his opinion, the only way to maintain the claim of the Russian Empire, that stands between civilizations, as an Asian and a European force, is to reinvigorate Eurasian geopolitics. Eurasianism is an indispensable strategy not only for Russia but also for the ascension of Atlantic-oriented, Eurasian forces against the Western alliance. In this interview, Dugin stresses his prospects on regional forces, Turkey in particular, precautions to be taken against the East and West, and the future in general.

The European Union (EU) completed its fifth enlargement process on May 1, 2004. In contrast to the previous ones, the main components of this enlargement consisted of the relatively poor Eastern and Central European countries. This enlargement extended the European geography from Helsinki to Valetta, Lisbon to Budapest. How do you evaluate the expansion of the EU into Russia's territory?

In general, I could say that I am on the side of a greater Europe. It could be a kind European Union possibly turning into a geopolitical pool, or a power balancing the American hegemony. An independent, powerful and united European Union is a unique opportunity to create a multi-polar world. However, there are two major powers within the EU: One is the Euro-Atlantic countries -- England, Portugal, Spain and some Eastern countries. In this group, England and the United States are the active powers. This group is against Russia and Eurasia, and its strategy is to cause continuous tension between the European West and the Eurasian East. The EU has two identities. One, as I have already said, is Euro-Atlantic and the second is the Berlin-Paris continental EU identity. The latter is independent from the Atlantic countries, powerful and democratic and tries to establish a European empire as an ally of both the United States and Eurasia. There is a secret disagreement between these two groups. The Eastern Europeans, the most recent members, have strengthened the Atlantic wing. But these countries, for some historical reasons, have stood up against Russia. Hence, we as Eurasians, the great and democratic European supporters,, view the most recent members in the Union standing up against Russia as a step against Eurasia itself. Therefore, in general, it is nice to see that these members are under the effect of the EU. It is already impossible to be a member.

How do you evaluate the situation of Russia, caught between the Greater Middle East Project and Europe? As a creator who established Eurasianism in thought, is it possible for Eurasianism to be an alternative to the great powers on top of the power hierarchy in the international system?

The United States aims to create a mono-polar world it can easily dominate and dictate its own geopolitical agenda. Since it has difficulty in doing this, crises have been experienced in the international system. As an alternative to this, we advocate a new multi-polar world, that is based on cooperation with Europe, Eurasia and the Pacific. We believe it is necessary that Eurasia, Europe and Russia play fundamental roles in this process.

What is the Russian viewpoint or that of the Eurasians on the Greater Middle East Project?

This is a ploy by the U.S. ultra-imperialist New Conservatives (neo-Cons), "the think-tanks" close to the Cheney-Bush circle. The plan is to wipe out Islam from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the other countries and to form regions directly controlled by the U.S. Turkey's role in this anti-Arab and anti-Islam play is to mediate as Bush mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Istanbul. But America does have the instruments to make this dream materialize. Apart from the Middle East, I am worried about our entering a larger conflict zone. It appears that the future of the world order will shape up according to the initiatives in this area.

What kind of message was Putin trying to deliver to the United States by not attending the NATO Summit in Istanbul?

The fate of NATO also resembles that of the EU. It has been divided into two groups; the pro-Atlantic and the pro-European. The summit in Istanbul organized under the headline, "Enforcement of the pro-transatlantic domination plans," also witnessed a diversity in opinion that manifested itself in the verbal quarrel between [Jacques] Chirac and [George W.] Bush. [Russian President Vladimir] Putin recognizes and supports the continental identity of NATO and seeks cooperation; but he cannot be enthused over NATO, that has a pro-transatlantic role, and will never be.

U.S. forces have been staging military maneuvers in the Caspian Sea. Can you evaluate their interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq by considering the effects on Russia? How will Russia probably react to this?

We need to take into consideration the U.S. tools in forming a mono-polar world. Just as Great Britain performed in the "Great Play" against the Soviets years ago, America now plans to control the Caucasus, Central Asia and other strategic areas, that are of importance to their aims. U.S. bases set up in Central Asia and at other similar points after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, have been established in strategic areas in Eurasia under the canopy of the fight against international terrorism. The strategists in Russia are being temped to perceive this as a challenge to Russia's national benefits. The other problem is that Russia is not strong enough to deal with America. If so, what should be done? To embark upon a diplomatic resistance against the United States by utilizing its diplomatic efficiency in Afghanistan, Arab countries and Central Asia is the best solution. Yet, Russia and Eurasia cannot display any efficiency without the support of European countries. They are supposed to develop alternative visions mutually.

You talked about the fight against international terrorism a few minutes ago. Do you believe that such a threat exists?

International terrorism is a kind of excuse that U.S. strategists are making so as to fill the counter- power vacuum that surfaced after the Soviet Empire became history. They needed a new enemy image in order to create a new world order. This is not a vehicle being used for massive propaganda; but at the same time, a strategic component of the United States to demonstrate its military might at any place in the world. Hence, the U.S. has has the opportunity to prove its military superiority, using the so-called fight against international terrorism as an excuse. Of course, there is terrorism and terrorists; however, this is not the kind of global enemy that America claims, in its bid to consolidate its global domination. To emphasize a point, we do not mean that we support or ignore terrorism. Please, note the distortions made by the United States.

Then, can we conclude that America is trying to use international terrorism because communism has been taken out of the scene?

Now the circumstances have changed a little. The communist world was a whole and it was concrete, while international terrorism is a global phenomenon. The United States has accepted the role of the world's policeman. Yet, what it does is mask the new American strategy based on imperial domination.

We often hear Putin talking about the threat of international terrorism, using almost the same jargon as Bush. How would you comment on this?

This is a political game and what is to be said has to be said. The United States and Russia seem to use the same jargon but what they talk about is different from each other. When America discusses international terrorism, we understand that it indeed tries to conceal the plans relevant to global domination, while Russia talks about the enemies fighting to disrupt stability in Eurasia and going beyond their limits. Russian military strategists perceive the U.S.-led NATO as commanding independent countries and bringing some radical groups to the fore.

How would Turkey contact Russia if the Turks played a role in the Greater Middle East Project? Would there be any tension in the region if Turkey cooperated with the United States?

Yes, there would, because Turkey has a double identity, a capacity to identify its regional strategies and position and an opportunity to deal with both Eurasia and Europe. In this way, Turkey is able to play a positive role independent of the Atlantic; but if it becomes a tool in the U.S. Greater Middle East Project, then Turkey would run the risk of having no agreement with both Russia and Europe. America plans to use Turkey not only against the Arab-Muslim Middle Eastern countries but also against Europe. A pro-American Turkey cannot solve any problem in the region, ideologically or strategically. Moreover, such an attempt will strain relations with Russia, Europe as well as with Islamic countries. As Turkey has an active role, it needs to shape its diplomatic relations in a Eurasian sense. As long as it follows the Greater Middle East policy through the path that America has modified, Turkey will be recognized as a second Israel. Turkey is expected to exert more intellectual and cultural efforts.

Already, the Turkish government - more often than not - has disclosed that it does not view the issue of being an American model affirmatively, and approaches the matter from the perspective of cooperation.

The United States is at the peak of its power, hence, European countries and Russia are not able to resist American policies as Turkey does. For the time being, there is nothing that can be done other than accepting the American projects. For this reason, Putin did not go against the U.S. bases in Central Asia. I can see that Turkey has partially accepted America's proposal, because, this is a realpolitik choice. However, it is certain that Turkey does not consist of the government alone. We know that Turkey has a complex social structure and the power of the army, political parties and religious inclination can easily be perceived. The Turkish public protested against the NATO Summit and adopted a position like the Eurasians. This is because the Turkish government could not explicitly recognize the strategy as Putin did. That is why the government's pragmatist steps should be viewed with understanding.

What is Russia's attitude towards Chechnya? Is it possible for Russia to change its policy towards this country?

Moscow has triumphed militarily in Chechnya but not politically. We could not explain to them why they had to remain within the borders of Russia and make them feel that they had a place within those borders. To solve the problem by military means rather than by political means was the greatest mistake of the Putin government. We propose a "Eurasian solution" on the Chechnya issue. Russia needs to offer Chechens the "Eurasian Plan for Chechnya." Chechens are active, brave and proud people. Chechen separatists are also supposed to be integrated into the Eurasia vision we mentioned before. Russia should better respect its good enemies and make them integrate into the Eurasia vision for a better future. Otherwise, much more chaos will be experienced.

Do you think that relations between Russia and Turkey change fast? Because, the Russian attitude towards us on the Cyprus issue six months ago was very severe. The Russian foreign minister, the day before, signed the conclusion report in which Mehmet Ali Talat used the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus prime minister's status at the Islamic Development Organization meeting. The chief adviser in the Prime Ministry, Ahmet Davutoglu, had mentioned in one of his speeches, an official meeting that Putin will embark upon in six months' time. If it comes true, a Russian president will visit Turkey for the first time in 30 years. Do you think this relation is a kind of marriage of convenience?

Russia's strategy of perceiving Turkey as an enemy changed after the Cold War ended. Turkey used to be America's ally in this double-polar world. But we are now in a mono-polar world and Turkey has many more alternatives than before. As a matter of fact, Turkey and Russia are located in a triangle as being both Eurasian and Western as well as Eastern countries. That is why Ankara and Russia strive to perceive each other as regional partners. Russia has changed its perspective ever since Turkey discovered the Eurasian dimension. I believe that Ahmet Davutoglu (a member of the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association) is aware of the Eurasia potential. There are some groups studying the Eurasian vision in Turkey. Hitherto, Russia totally used to support the Greek side on the Cyprus issue. But now the parameters have changed. The importance the Turkish Cypriots give to their independence is already well known; yet, Turkey, like other countries, is aware that its characteristics are being threatened by the wind of globalization in this mono-polar world where America is the sole leader. The same applies to Russia. Then, wouldn't it be abnormal for the two countries to strive in seeking a new alliance that would not mean a kind of colonialism or expansionism; but a kind of cooperation awakening democracy and finding specific solutions to the problems of the multi-polar world.

600 Vow to Fight ‘Orange Pest’ in St. Petersburg Times, 10 april 2007.

MOSCOW — About 600 young people gathered under imperial black banners on Triumfalnaya Ploshchad on Sunday as their leaders pledged support to President Vladimir Putin and vowed to fight an “orange revolution” in Russia.

The Eurasian Youth Union, a nationalist group whose chief ideologist, Alexander Dugin, has close ties to the Kremlin, had planned a march along Tverskaya Ulitsa, but city authorities only sanctioned the two-hour rally near Mayakovskaya metro station.

“We are supporters of the regime. We support Putin because he created the prerequisites for the rebirth of the nation,” Dugin told the rally. “We want guarantees that Putin will stay for a third term or secure the continuity of his course.”

The Eurasian Youth Union is seen as a Kremlin-backed project to divert youth political activism from the banned, oppositional National Bolsheviks, who demand that Putin resign. When the group was created last year, its leaders pledged to fight Western attempts to influence Russian politics.

“Russia should be strong and not crawling under the West,” Dmitry Zakharov, a rally participant, said Sunday.

Other participants said they had come to oppose the “orange pest,” referring to Western-backed opposition groups. Such groups played an important role in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004.

“National Bolsheviks want to monopolize street protests and the notion of civil society for themselves, and we want to show everybody today that we, too, are a part of civil society,” said Pavel Kanishchev, waving a black flag decorated with eight yellow arrows symbolizing Russia’s imperial expansion.

The rally began with a public prayer by an Orthodox priest, followed by a monarchic hymn sung by a bearded baritone wearing black garb.

Several participants who declined to give their names said they were not politically active and had come to Moscow because they had been offered a free bus ride.

“There are many people like us here, mostly students from vocational schools in Kovrov, Vladimir and other towns,” said a teenage girl with blue hair and a pierced nose. “I can’t wait for the boring stuff to end and go for a walk.”

St. Petersburg Times

AN IMPERIAL EASTER in Kommersant, 10 april 2007.

About 700 members of the Eurasian Youth Union gathered in central Moscow on Sunday to hold the Imperial March, an Orthodox Christian demonstration, to promote the return of the Russian empire. Speaking at the demonstration, Aleksandr Dugin, the organization's spiritual leader, said participants were prepared to "fight for the sake of immortality" and called the United States the "kingdom of the anti-Christ." As in other protests, the city dispatched a large force of police and riot troops, though no arrests were reported.

Eurasia Vol. I n°2 : La Révolution conservatrice russe, 12/2006.

Semestriel de géopolitique de l'association "Les Nôtres"
Sommaire 12/2006 :
- Eurasia : Présentation
- Dossier Alexandre Douguine : La Révolution conservatrice russe
- Varia : Jean Claude Manifacier : Le Déracinement du Monde
- Texte retrouvé : Ernst von Salomon : Apprendre à mourir
- Eurasia : Lectures eurasiennes

Présentation d’Eurasia : Depuis une quinzaine d’années, une nouvelle idéologie politique a surgi dans la Russie post-soviétique. Bien qu’encore peu connue en Occident, cette doctrine s’est fortement développée et enrichie, se diffusant surtout parmi les élites russes mais aussi celles de "l’étranger proche" (principalement les républiques musulmanes anciennement soviétiques) et même en Europe, en Turquie, en Iran, etc. Cette nouvelle idéologie s’appelle l’eurasisme, et elle est inséparable de la figure de son fondateur, le philosophe et géopoliticien russe, Alexandre Douguine.

Le premier eurasisme fut fondé en 1920 par des intellectuels russes de l’émigration (N. Trubetskoy, P. Savitsky, N. Alexeiev, etc.). Ceux-ci affirmaient que l’identité russe était née d’une fusion originale entre les éléments slave et turco-musulman, que la Russie constituait un "troisième continent" situé entre l’Occident (dénoncé comme matérialiste et décadent) et l’Asie. Le livre-manifeste du mouvement était d’ailleurs intitulé Tournant vers l’Orient (Petr Savitsky, 1921). Les eurasistes se démarquaient des nationalistes classiques et des slavophiles. Sans être communistes, ils n’étaient pas opposés à l’expérience soviétique, qu’ils regardaient comme la continuation de l’idée impériale russe.

Dans le contexte strictement russe, l’eurasisme est une sorte de troisième voie située entre l’orientation pro-occidentale ultralibérale et la nostalgie du passé communiste, tout en évitant les excès démagogiques du populisme extrémiste et du nationalisme étroit. Douguine définit lui-même son mouvement comme un "centre radical" et comme "le premier parti géopolitique". Avec Douguine, l’eurasisme n’est plus une simple idéologie politique, c’est un système de pensée et une vision du monde.

En avril 2001, Alexandre Douguine a créé le Mouvement social politique pan-russe Eurasia, qui a donné naissance, en novembre 2003, à Moscou, au Mouvement international eurasien, conçu comme une ONG et représenté dans vingt-deux pays.


En avril 2001, Alexandre Douguine a créé le Mouvement social politique pan-russe Eurasia, qui a donné naissance, en novembre 2003, à Moscou, au Mouvement international eurasien, conçu comme une ONG et représenté dans vingt-deux pays.

Alexandre Douguine a trouvé des relais en France depuis le début des années 1990. Il est venu à de multiples reprises dans notre pays où il a participé à de nombreux colloques. Ses principaux écrits ont été traduits dans notre langue et diffusés sous la forme de livres et d’articles. Certains sont même accessibles sur la toile.

Lancé par une équipe en contact avec Alexandre Douguine depuis près de quinze ans, Eurasia s’est donné comme ambition de présenter au public francophone, à un rythme semestriel, les idées du géopoliticien russe et des autres idéologues de l’Eurasie, ainsi que de tous ceux qui ont rêvé à un Imperium grand-européen (Thiriart, Niekisch, Yockey, etc.).

Askesis

Ukraine on the brink of breakup door Expert in Vremya Novostei, 4 april 2007.

Watching the new political crisis in Ukraine unravel, Russian politicians and political experts are reminded of October 1993 and the Russia's use of force to dissolve the Supreme Council. Some experts believe that the neighboring country is on the brink of splitting up.

Alexander Dugin, leader of the International Eurasian Movement, "Civil war is underway in Ukraine, and it may lead to its splitting into at least two states. A compromise between Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and President Viktor Yushchenko (and, consequently, between the East and West of the country) is exhausted. It is not certain whether eastern Ukraine will be ours, although, of course, it is more oriented towards Russia. Unfortunately, in recent years we have missed many changes in Ukraine and in other post-Soviet countries too."

Sergei Karaganov, chairman of the presidium of the Council for Foreign and Security Policy, "This was so predictable. This crisis has deep roots that have their origin in the heart of Ukraine's political system. Moreover, this crisis will be repeated over and over. The reason is that the Orange Revolution, on the one hand, brought about legitimate results (both political and moral), but on the other, it created a political system that was always susceptible to such crises. Any politician working in such a system will inevitably be pushed towards a crisis. I hope that Ukrainians, given their national character, will not end up shooting at each other, although we, their neighbors, did shoot in 1993."

Valery Fyodorov, CEO of the VTsIOM pollster, "The deepening in the crisis could have been foreseen. As for the outlook, the next parliamentary election, if it does take place, will not significantly change the balance of power. If there are any further changes, they will probably be toward further polarization of political power. However, the internal balance in each of the conflicting camps could alter. Viktor Yushchenko's bloc could finally cede its position in the Orange camp, while Yanukovych's position may weaken slightly among the white-and-blue, because being the prime minister, he had to make several unpopular decisions over the past year."

KREMLIN USING NATIONALISTIC RHETORIC TO NEUTRALIZE OPPOSITION BEFORE ELECTIONS door Andrei SMIRNOV in Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2 april 2007.

On March 24, the authorities in the Russian city of Nizhny Novgorod brutally broke up an anti-government rally using riot police.

The Nizhny Novgorod rally was the third “March of the Discontents” organized by Other Russia, a coalition of opposition parties and groups have united into the “Other Russia” movement to protest the increasing power of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Other Russia’s leaders include Eduard Limonov, head of the leftist National-Bolshevik Party; former world chess champion Garry Kasparov, now leader of the United Civic Front; and former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov, now leader of the People’s Democratic Party. The first rally was held in Moscow last December, and the second one took place in St. Petersburg in March. Each time the Kremlin ordered local authorities to ban the demonstration, while the opposition insisted on the constitutional right to have rallies wherever they wanted. The uncompromising stances of both sides led to street clashes between demonstrators and the police during all three rallies.

The Kremlin’s nervous reaction suggests that the Russian authorities fear a united front consisting of left-wing and liberal opposition forces. The opposition demands free elections, an end to the continued growth of payments for housing and utilities, and clamors for higher wages and pensions. This cocktail of demands could easily attract half of the Russian population if the opposition had access to major mass media sources like federal TV channels. The latest Levada Center poll shows that the popularity of Kasyanov, a possible candidate for the presidency in 2008, doubled in March -- from 3% to 6% -- despite an almost total media blackout. Few, if any, Russians listed Kasyanov as a potential candidate less than four months ago.

The Kremlin understands that the police alone are not enough to dampen the opposition. Therefore, it seeks a counter-ideology to discredit the anti-Putin forces in the eyes of the population.

On March 20, Alexander Dugin, leader of the International Eurasian Movement, held a press conference to announce that the movement would hold an "Imperial March" in Moscow on April 8. This idea was supported by Mikhail Leontiyev, a pro-Putin TV anchorman famous for blaming the United States for the massacre in Beslan, and by two Russian radical nationalist writers, Alexander Prokhanov and Maxim Kalashnikov.

Dugin said that the Imperial March was a reaction to the next March of Discontents, planned for April 14 in Moscow. "The Russian public dreams of marching towards the great state while the orange scum [a reference to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine] wants to take this opportunity away from us.” Using a derisive nickname based on rumors that Kasyanov demanded a cut to ratify any contract with the Russian government, Dugin continued: "Misha Two Percent and Kasparov, an insane chess player, hit our sorest point – Vladimir Putin" (Vek, March 21). At the same time, Mikhail Leontiyev called the Other Russia leaders "scamps who receive money from abroad and who pay fools to take part in demonstrations and complain" (Novy Region, March 20).

But according to Ludmila Alekseeva, head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, "In fact, there are not too many people who can be inspired by the ideas of the Imperial March in Russia, but this demonstration could attract several thousand people only if it has secret support from the authorities" (Interfax, March 20).

The Imperial March is not the only effort to counter the March of Discontents. On March 25, the pro-Kremlin Nashi Movement organized a political show in Moscow called "The President’s Liaison." That day about 15,000 activists, bussed to the Russian capital from all over the country, spread around the city asking passersby to complete a questionnaire. If a person agreed with the content of the questionnaire, a Nashi activist gave him a cell phone SIMM card that could be used to send messages to Putin. One of the questions in the questionnaire was whether the respondent agreed that moving away from Putin’s cause meant "dark times" for Russia and the seizure of power by puppets of the West and extremists.

Another question asked: "Can you exclude the possibility of a coup or foreign intervention initiated by Mikhail Kasyanov under the pretext of bringing NATO troops into Russia to guard nuclear facilities and oil and gas pipelines?" Those who filled out the questionnaire were also required to choose between "mighty Russia and a colony of the West" (Ekho Moskvy, March 25).

Officials have also tried to depict the opposition as agents of the United States. When the police broke up the Nizhny Novgorod rally, Sergei Popov, deputy head of Nizhny Novgorod region, said that the protest had been "sponsored by the United States and some European countries” (Interfax, March 24).

The ideological standoff of the opposition and the authorities has much deeper roots than just a struggle for votes before the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia. The opposition and the Kremlin offer two competing visions of the future. One of them offers democracy and improved living conditions for ordinary people while the other calls for a new Soviet-style empire. Which path the Russian public chooses will be revealed very soon.

Eurasia Daily Monitor

Next in Moscow: The Imperial March in Kommersant Moscow, 20 maart 2007.

Alexander Dugin's “Orthodox Christian national patriotic” Eurasian Movement issued a statement yesterday on its intentions of holding a march in Moscow on April 8 to be called the Imperial March. The march is to protest the opposition Other Russia's March of Those Who Disagree, the next one of which is scheduled for April 14. According to Pavel Zarifullin, leader of the Eurasian Youth Union and one of the organizers of the march, 1500 participants are expected including writers Alexander Prokhanov and Maxim Kalashnikov, television host Mikhail Leontyev, members of the National Bolshevik Front (a breakaway group from Eduard Limonov's organization), the Ukrainian party Russian Bloc and the Ukrainian Labor Conference.

“Among the people, there is great disappointment with the Orange, but the Orange are now raising their heads, as the recent March of Those Who Disagree in St. Petersburg showed,” Zarifullin said. “We need an imperial project that supports Putin. We don't want a Maidan in this country.”

Zarifullin made it clear that he considers pro-Kremlin groups such as Our, the Youth Guardian of a United Russia, Young Russia and the Local allies.

“We are also fighting the Orange revolutions,” Youth Guardian organizer for the Central Federal District Alexey Shaposhnikov said, “but they can be fought differently.”

“They, of course, will receive a permit to march,” observed Yulia Malysheva, leader of Mikhail Kasyanov's People's Democratic Union of Youth. “They are a completely Kremlin project, Putin-Jugend. I hope they have the brains not to dress up like Santa Claus this time,” she added, referring to an action by government supporters the day after the first March of Those Who Disagree.

National Bolshevik leader Eduard Limonov asked rhetorically “Who needs them? They are corrupt and disgraceful. Three strange men with beards will show up and march together.”

Bron: Kommersant

“We are in a geopolitical stalemate.” – Aleksandr Dugin in The Georgian Times, 14 maart 2007.

A week ago Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II, paid a five-day visit to Moscow. The Georgian delegation of high dignitaries took a direct flight to Russia, inspiring hopes in many people that the visit could become a starting point for a long-awaited détente between Georgia and Russia.

However, Russian political circles do not share this optimism—at least, Aleksandr Dugin doesn’t. Dugin, a Russian scholar and founder of the Russian school of geopolitics often known as “Eurasianism,” explained his pessimism to The Georgian Times.

Q: Georgian-Russian relations seem to be improving. How realistic is this impression?

A: Unfortunately, Georgian-Russian relations have been deadlocked. I cannot imagine how the situation can improve in any way. This is not a conflict between people or presidents—this is a conflict between geopolitical choices. This makes the situation between us rather complicated. Brotherly Orthodox Georgian and Russian people find themselves in a situation where the conflict boils down to differences in geopolitical principles.

Q: Do you think the recent meeting between Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia Ilia II and Patriarch of Russia Alexy II will defuse tensions in any way?

A: Frankly speaking, I do not think it will. No one doubts the friendship of our nations and their spiritual proximity. The Russian Orthodox Church sometimes even runs counter to our geopolitical interests, as it does not support the calls of Tskhinvali region [South Ossetia – Ed.] Orthodox Church for separation from the Georgian patriarchy.

The Church does everything it can on a spiritual level. But there are things that the Church is unable to deal with. This is a geopolitical confrontation. As long as Georgia takes a pro-Atlantic, pro-American position, nothing can change the situation, neither a visit by your Patriarch nor Moscow Patriarchy’s support of Georgia.

He [the Russian Patriarch –Ed.] supports Georgia on every issue, including that of Abkhazia. I think everything is perfect at the church level, but that cannot change anything in geopolitics, and our conflict stems from geopolitics.

Q: The US wants to station its anti-missile radars in Poland and may position defense elements in the Caucasus as well. Georgia in this sense is the most probable home for a radar station. What should Georgia expect from Russia if this is the case?

A: I think we are on the brink of a serious conflict between Russia and the US. This is going to be an open Cold War. If the US deploys its defense system in Georgia, than we will view Georgia as an absolute foe. Then no visits will take place whatsoever and nothing will be able to regulate our relations.

Then situation will change on religious level as well, and Abkhazia will become an eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. Then relations with Georgia will turn into a kind of war and Russia will start deporting all Georgians.

Q: Relations with Russia would not have hit such lows and Tbilisi would not have begun eyeing the US if not for the conflict zones and Moscow’s support of their separatism. Let us just consider the recent ‘elections’ in Abkhazia. No one but Russia recognized them. Cannot Russia take steps that would improve our relations?

A: I think none of the parties can do anything that would improve the situation. I am not saying that it is the fault of Russia or Georgia. But Tbilisi’s decision to choose the US as its partner means the severance of relations between Russia and Georgia. You cannot ask anything from Tbilisi because of this choice.

But why did it happen? Perhaps Russia, too, should be to blame, but this is already a reality. We could have just confined our relations to endless accusations, or we could have made consensus, etc., until Saakashvili made a very sharp, clear orientation in favor of the US.

What else can we talk about, or who are we to talk to after this fact? Despite its great wishes, Russia cannot do anything. What is happening now is the law of geopolitics. It makes no sense to talk about who is wrong and who is right, what mistakes Russia has made or what we should have done. We are in a geopolitical stalemate.

Bron: The Georgian Times